

INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTO THE JOINT
TARGETING PROCESS

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by

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ABSTRACT

THE INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTO THE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS, by MAJ Johnny L. Hester, 93 pages.

Presently, evidence shows that Special Operations Forces may not be fully utilized in the joint targeting process. I believe that Special Operations Forces can be employed in new and improved ways in order to better facilitate the Joint Force Commander's fight. I obtained information to support my position by using a Delphi Study to solicit the aid of experts on the joint targeting process to supply information concerning how Special Operations Forces are being presently utilized and opinions on how these forces could be better utilized by the Joint Forces Commander. The Delphi Study involves selecting experts from the field and from military academic institutions to form two panels. They were asked to formulate with prompts how they felt Special Operations Forces are presently being utilized and how they should be utilized by the Joint Forces Commander. A Likert style scale was used to determine consensus on each of the responses. Based on these responses, analysis and conclusions were formed to determine how Special Operations Forces should be more effectively utilized in new and improved ways to facilitate the Joint Forces Commander's fight. The evidence supports the conclusion that Special Operations Forces should be integrated at every phase of the joint targeting process in very specific as well as general ways. Technological and political changes are taking place today that require that the United States Army be prepared to fight in every conceivable environment and under any conceivable conditions and restraints. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq testify to the fact that Special Operations Force, with the proper integration into and the support of the joint targeting process, are truly indispensable on the battlefield as well as before and after the conflict.

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ACRONYMS

AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Component
AFSOF	Air Force Special Operations Forces
AOC	Air Operation Center
ACO	Airspace Control Order
AIRSUPREQ	Air Support Request
ATC	Air Tasking Cycle
ATO	Air Tasking Order
ALLOREQ	Allocation Request
AAGS	Army Air Ground System
ASOC	Air Support Operation Center
ARSOA	Army Special Operations Aviation
ARSOC	Army Special Operations Component
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ARSOTF	Army Special Operations Task Force
CARVER	Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, Recognizability
GATB	Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Board
JAO	Joint Air Operations
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Center
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
MAPP	Master Air Attack Plan
SOLE	Special Operations Liaison Element

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During any period of time, Special Operations Forces (SOF) are deployed on point throughout the world for the United States (US) and are prepared for any contingency that might arise. SOF are prepared to function in any geographic region and environment in times of peace or war. The flexibility of SOF allows its members to begin conducting military operations and to quickly set the conditions for follow-on decisive action within a problem area.

SOF have many ways of shaping the battlefield. However, this study will focus on the joint targeting process and how to better incorporate the SOF at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

Problem Statement

Presently, it appears that SOF may not be fully integrated into the joint targeting process. Although targeting is a joint force commander (JFC) operations responsibility, the bulk of JFC target nominations occurs during the first four steps of the air tasking cycle (ATC) in the joint air operations center (JAOC). In step one, the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) recommends the guidance apportionment and targeting (GAT) function. In step two, with respect to targeting, the GAT staff takes the air support request (AIRSUPREQ) and begins to form a draft of the joint integrated and prioritized target list (JIPTL). The draft JIPTL is presented to the JFC at the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) for approval. In step three, the available assets are matched to

specific targets in the master air attack plan (MAAP) meeting. Once the MAAP is completed, it is converted in step four into an air tasking order (ATO).

It seems that all of these actions are done on behalf of air, and sometimes Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAM) (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, 1-10). That is to say, when targets are considered for interdiction, only air assets are directed against them. This seems to go against the nature of joint targeting. It appears that SOF are not considered in the first four phases of the joint targeting process, even though research indicates that they should be.

Thesis Question

SOF are not being fully utilized in the joint targeting process, whether SOF are acting as a combat weapons system or are being fully engaged in the planning cycle for targeting. SOF bring specialized capabilities that allow this force to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict. SOF offer senior commanders alternative means conventional forces cannot provide. I believe SOF can be employed in new and improved ways in order to better facilitate the JFC's fight. The question to be researched by this document is how SOF can be better integrated into the joint targeting process.

Subordinate Questions

The most significant point to consider is how joint targeting doctrine integrates SOF into the joint targeting process. There is evidence to indicate that the joint targeting process does not adequately utilize SOF in the earlier stages of the targeting cycle and that alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures should be made available to more effectively integrate SOF into the joint targeting process. It is essential to modify the joint targeting process in order to more effectively utilize SOF.

It is important to look at the special operations liaison element (SOLE), which provides SOF liaison to the JFACC or the appropriate service component air command and control facility. It is imperative to understand the role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process. The SOLE reports directly to the joint forces special operations component commander (JFSOCC). The SOLE coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates special operations air and surface activity with conventional air activity. This is done at the JAOC within the JFACC (United States Special Operations Command 1998, 3-6).

In effect, the SOLE is composed mainly of air component special operations representatives and only two ground representatives (United States Special Operations Command 1998, A-1). They understand the air planning system and integrate well with it. A question to be answered is, Are they configured and authorized by the JFSOCC to represent ground SOF as the JFC targeting process is conducted?

Another point of interest to consider is how SOF can be employed as a precision combat weapon system during the joint targeting process. SOF capabilities allow them to operate on highly sensitive missions where normal conventional elements cannot operate. Some of these missions could be the neutralization of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), engagement of a high value target (HVT), or the ability to guide precision munitions onto a critical node.

Significance of the Study

This study will assist SOF personnel in viewing their roles in the joint targeting process and how they support the JFC plan. It is important that SOF understand this comprehensive process in order to better facilitate the effects desired in a contiguous or noncontiguous area of operation (AO) defined by the JFC. SOF ability to conduct

shaping operations of the battlespace is unprecedented. Whether it is through direct action, unconventional warfare, or special reconnaissance, SOF elements support the JFC's decisive action.

Background

Joint targeting is the process of combining two or more elements of a different military service in order to capture or destroy a geographical area, complex, installation, or military force (Widhammer 2001, 5-6). It will be put into effect by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in coordination with the combatant commanders, the different Armed Services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of joint targeting is to prevent duplication of effort and to provide a common language for joint operations. Since 1991, U.S. military forces have participated in numerous joint operations. Because of the downsizing of the military and the increased military commitment in the free world, the majority of operations in the future will be joint operations (Westa 1999).

The selection of targets for attack as a logical process in the US military has changed dramatically from conflicts early in the twentieth century. Ever since Desert Storm, the Armed Services have been working to develop a joint targeting integration process. In the past, each of the services was practically autonomous in its selection of targets. Unity of effort was spontaneous at best and, frequently, the enemy had the opportunity to capitalize on US inability to concentrate assets on target (Widhammer 2001, 6-9).

Indeed, the history of the modern targeting process was in its infancy during World War I. At that time, the objective of an army was to encounter and defeat an enemy on the field of battle. There was very little technological development and very

few specialized production centers worthy of being included on a target list (Widhammer 2001, 6-9).

During the years between the two World Wars, technology advanced, especially with the rapid growth of the automobile industry. The targeting concept emerged as modern nations developed centralized systems to provide electricity, fuel, and water. A generic target list could be created, indicating which systems needed to be destroyed in order to defeat the will of the enemy and his capability to maintain an army in the field (Widhammer 2001, 6-9).

The targeting concept was first used extensively during World War II. Weapons production requirements created technological studies of weapons and defenses that required sophisticated analysis. Subject matter experts provided detailed analysis of the industrial, political, and military capabilities of the enemy. The weaponeering analyses were the forefront of force planning. With the end of the war, the emphasis changed to intelligence collection and warning systems designed to detect enemy aggression. The joint targeting process became secondary in strategic planning (Smith 1994, 37-39).

During the Korean War, the US military was forced to develop targeting methodology for mobile targets. It soon became evident that there must be a fusion between intelligence collection and operational planning and execution. After the Korean War, the rise of nuclear targeting overshadowed conventional targeting (Smith 1994, 37-39).

During the Vietnam War, tactical targeting again became predominant and SOF became a part of the targeting process. Also, weapons effects data were quantified,

standardized, and distributed to all Armed Services. At this time, the United States Air Force (USAF) began conducting formalized targeting training (Widhammer 2001, 6-8).

It was during Desert Storm that the process was applied to clearly identifiable joint targeting objectives. However, massive firepower blurred the capability to monitor and support efficient targeting. The coalition forces frequently failed to conduct battle damage assessments (BDA) for many of the targets that were attacked. Therefore, it was impossible to assess the level of accomplishment of the commanders' objectives (Schmidt and Williams 1992, 61-67).

Post Gulf War thinking reinforced the need for efficient and effective targeting, and the utilization of precision weapons required the employment of highly trained weaponeers. Smart weapons require smart employment. However, after the Gulf War, downsizing of the combatant force led to the closing of the USAF Targeting Officer's School and the Army's Targeting School. The reductions in the force removed many targeteers from the Armed Services. Since then, the Armed Services have reopened a Joint Targeting School at Dam Neck, Virginia (Schmidt and Williams 1992, 61-67).

The asymmetrical threat is revolutionizing the joint targeting process. American public opinion and international politics have forced the JFC to rely more on SOF and combat airpower than he has in the past to decisively defeat the enemy. In conflicts such as in Afghanistan, it is no longer an option to mass forces on the ground. Instead, U.S. Armed Forces are relying on the global reach and precision engagement of joint airpower to accomplish national objectives (Sullivan 2002). As our military begins to fight asymmetrically, it is becoming evident that SOF should be consistently an integral part of the combatant commander's campaign plan as a combat multiplier.

As history demonstrates, SOF are becoming more and more critical to the success of military operations in supporting national strategic objectives. It is the purpose of this thesis to explore how SOF can be more effectively integrated into the joint targeting process. As our military begins to fight asymmetrically, it is becoming evident that SOF should be consistently an integral part of the combatant commander's campaign plan as a combat multiplier.

Assumptions

SOF will play a critical role in the future in planning and executing the joint targeting process. Joint and SOF doctrine will change within the next decade.

Limitations

To answer these questions, it may be necessary to research classified or hard to obtain and publish information concerning the procedural aspects of the joint targeting process. Also, much information upon which to base a conclusion may no longer exist as actors in the various campaigns disperse throughout the military and into civilian life.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since it appears that SOF are not adequately utilized in the joint targeting process, it is necessary to determine the degree of utilization, if any, which presently exists. A survey of the literature will disclose where and to what extent SOF have been utilized in the recent past. This background information forms a basis from which determinations can be made to answer the thesis question, "How can SOF be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process?" The majority of the publications utilized in this study consist of recently released joint publications produced by the Department of Defense, U.S. Army field manuals, magazine articles, student guides, and other documents.

Source Review

Several joint publications (JP) address directly or indirectly the issues with which this thesis is concerned. The knowledge from these publications is important to reference when changes are proposed which are intended to integrate SOF more effectively into the joint targeting process.

JP 0-2, *Unified Actions Armed Forces*, provides the doctrine and policy governing unified direction of forces. It discusses doctrine and policy for joint command and control. It also covers multinational operations and provides doctrine and policy for establishing joint commands.

JP-3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, discusses the strategic environment within which joint operations take place and considerations for multinational operations. It lists the fundamental principles of joint operations and principles for military operations other

than war. It also covers planning guidance for war and military operations other than war, as well as describes the considerations for the conduct of joint operations during war.

JP 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, discusses the fundamental principles of targeting, the joint targeting process, and integration of component targeting processes, and provides time-sensitive target considerations. It also outlines the joint force targeting duties and responsibilities.

JP 3-05.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*, looks at Special Operations integration into joint planning and targeting. It discusses Special Operations deliberate mission planning and targeting, and crisis action mission planning and targeting.

JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, provides an introduction to joint special operations. It discusses the forces and missions used in joint special operations and describes organizational command and control. It covers the planning for joint special operations and discusses the preparation and support of joint SOF.

JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, provides an overview of joint special operations and guidance for establishing a joint operations task force. It also discusses command and control relationships and considerations. It covers functional areas of operations, planning, intelligence, logistics, and systems. In addition, it describes the methodology for training, exercises, and assessments.

JP 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, discusses the nature of joint-air-operations-related considerations and planning related to joint air operations. It

provides general considerations for command and control, as well as targeting and tasking for joint air operations.

A number of U.S. Army field manuals (FMs) cover SOF doctrine. FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (ARSOF), describes the principles, fundamentals, guidelines, and conceptual framework to facilitate mutual operations with both conventional and other Army SOF. It also establishes the foundation for doctrine developing tactics, techniques, and procedures concerning SOF.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. Its foundation is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process*, focuses on the principles and philosophies of the joint targeting process. It also examines targeting methodology and operating in a joint environment.

FM 31-20-5, *Special Reconnaissance Tactic, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces*, provides the doctrinal bases for the conduct of special reconnaissance (SR) missions across the operational continuum.

FM 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations*, focuses on the operational level of SOF, covering missions, organization, command and control, operational bases, targeting and mission planning, and support and sustainment. The knowledge from these field manuals is important to know how changes can be made at the operational level and whether standard operating procedures (SOP) are already in place which would facilitate the integration of SOF more effectively into the joint targeting process.

Another relevant publication for this review is the *Student Guide* written for the Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck, Virginia. This student guide provides a very structured, systematic approach to the joint targeting process. Understanding this structure is important in formulating policy and procedures for the integration of SOF more effectively into the joint targeting process.

Several magazine articles address the joint targeting process. "Disjointed or Joint Targeting," an article by Colonel John W. Schmidt and Colonel Clinton L. Williams in the September, 1992 *Marine Corps Gazette*, discusses joint targeting problems during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. "Joint Targeting Doctrine," by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Murphy and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Bernd L. Ingram in the September 2001 *Field Artillery*, discusses the nature and effects of joint fire support and the joint targeting process. Information from these articles helps reveal the extent to which SOF have been integrated into the joint targeting process.

Other documents include "TAGS Multiservice Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System," by the Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, which provides a generic concept and procedures for theater air-ground system (TAGS) operations. It also describes each of the services' air control systems, mission, and warfare capabilities. Directive # 525-7, "Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE)," MacDill AFB, Florida, expands the concepts, responsibilities, functions, and procedures for the SOLE. PAYSOLE1. DOC, Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) to the JFACC, HQ AFSOC, assists personnel assigned to the SOLE to understand the job and the role they play in the successful accomplishment of SO during contingencies and exercises. These

documents help provide background information for understanding how the joint targeting process works and how SOF can be better utilized.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the design and methodology used in the study to determine how SOF can be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process is described. This study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Based on published documents, how are SOF presently integrated into the joint targeting process?
2. According to published documents, what is the role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process?
3. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, should additional land component personnel be allocated to the SOLE in order to provide the expertise necessary to more effectively integrate special operations land forces into the joint targeting process?
4. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, what alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures are available for the more effective integration of SOF into the joint targeting process?
5. According to published documents, at what point in the joint targeting process are SOF considered a viable and tactical weapons system?
6. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, where and when should SOF be applied in the joint targeting process?

7. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, how should the joint targeting process become modified for more effective utilization of SOF?

8. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, are there other factors to consider concerning how SOF should be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process?

The analysis and results presented in this thesis are based on responses to a questionnaire, developed by the author, by a panel of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine. The procedures used to select the panel are discussed in this chapter. The design of the study, the Delphi instrument, data gathering and analysis procedures, and treatment of the data are explained.

Selection of the Sample

The five basic criteria which should be involved in selecting an expert panel are (Delbecq 1975):

1. Panelists must have a basic understanding of the problem area and be able to apply that understanding.
2. They must have a good performance record in their particular area.
3. They must possess a high degree of objectivity and rationality.
4. They must have the time available to participate to the conclusion of the program.
5. They must be willing to give the amount of time and effort to do a thorough job of participation.

The population of this study is selected based on Delbecq's five basic criteria that should be involved in selecting an expert panel. He states that the panel size should be the minimum necessary, but there are no specific guidelines for determining the optimum number of panel members to use. This study involves twenty participants, ten on each of two panels.

Instrumentation

The Delphi technique was chosen because of the nature of the study. The study is designed to bring about a consensus on how SOF can be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process. The Delphi technique is described as relying on the informed judgment of a knowledgeable panel of persons concerning a topic or issue for which reliable objective data are difficult to obtain (Weatherman 1977 and Cunningham 1982). The process is implemented in an anonymous fashion to insure each panel member equal input and to negate the undesirable aspects of group interaction. It includes the use of controlled feedback to produce a carefully considered group response and to hasten consensus. The Delphi technique eliminates committee activity among a panel of experts and replaces it with a carefully designed program of sequential individual interrogations along with information input and opinion feedback (Hunt 1982).

The Delphi technique has several advantages over other methods of obtaining opinions on matters which are difficult to quantify (Tuckman 1972). Most advantages are due to the anonymity of the respondents, which helps eliminate bias. Participants find it easier to change their minds if ego is not involved. The findings are not as influenced by the halo effect, in which one influential person has an impact on the opinion of others. The bandwagon effect, which encourages agreement with the majority, is also reduced.

A major advantage is that the Delphi process forms a consensus by requiring justification for any significant deviation from the group average. The Delphi process encourages individual thinking and forces respondents to move toward consensus unless strong convictions to the contrary are held.

The Delphi technique has proved workable for specific fields of investigation (Brooks 1979). The technique is reasonably inexpensive in time and money and the results are clearly usable. The process is a method which is valuable when no other methods are available or when other methods are too expensive (Cyphert 1971). The Delphi technique is particularly applicable when a problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can benefit from subjective judgments on a collective basis (Linstone and Turoff 1975). Experimental results indicate that the Delphi process is at least a good predictor, with predictions relatively close to actuality.

The Delphi method is one of the most promising tools available to help planners prepare for the future (Orlich 1978). Properly used, it tends to generate speculation on the future rather than predicting the future. It lends itself to getting better decisions that account for alternative consequences by enhancing the capacity of planners to think in complex ways about the future.

The following diagram (figure 1) helps explain the Delphi process.




Figure 1. Methodology

The Delphi technique is also outlined in the following steps (Borg 1989):

1. Select a panel of experts.
2. Question the experts independently.
3. Feed information about the responses back to the experts.
4. Invite the experts to revise their prediction or to give rationale for not doing so.
5. Repeat the process until a consensus is achieved.

Three to four rounds would be sufficient to achieve meaningful results

(Weatherman 1977). Additional rounds are generally not necessary, since standard deviations become low enough to justify satisfaction with the level of consensus.

Procedures

This study was conducted during the winter and spring of 2003. The author applied the Delphi technique with minor modifications to conform to the conditions under which the research was conducted.

The first step identifies candidates for two Delphi panels which conform to the five basic criteria that should be involved in selecting an expert panel (Delbecq 1975). The institutional schoolhouses that write and implement doctrine provided the experts for one panel of this study. The following institutions were solicited:

1. Joint Special Operations University (Hurlburt Field, Florida)
2. Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)
3. United States Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School - Directorate of Doctrine and Training (Fort Bragg, North Carolina)

The second panel consisted of personnel who have implemented doctrine in the field. An example of one source for these individuals is the SOLE.

In order to obtain statistical reliability, nominees were assigned numbers and ten were selected randomly for each of the two panels to fairly represent the pool of leaders who influence and implement military policy. Two additional individuals were also selected for each panel as back-up in case anyone of the group on the panel was unable to complete the study.

A Round 1 questionnaire asking how SOF can be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process was developed (Isaac 1989). The Round 1 questionnaire and an explanation of the study were sent to each respondent. Responses from each of the two

panels were compiled and responses that were similar in meaning were combined to represent one concept.

A Likert-style questionnaire based on the responses from Round 1 was developed and a preference index was developed based on the following scale:

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly Agree

These four indicators were chosen in order to avoid the central tendency effect and to force the panelists to make a decision about each item and not simply rely on selecting a middle number which amounts to being undecided or having no comment. The Likert-style questionnaire for Round 2 of the Delphi study, with cover letters (Appendix D), was sent to the panelists. At no time in the study did panelists interact with each other in any way or know how other members of the panel responded to items on the questionnaire.

Statistical data of mean, mode, median, variance, and standard deviation for each item on the questionnaire were calculated. Outliers responding to each item were contacted to determine whether or not they wished to defend their responses based on the statistics from the general response.

Data Analysis

Based on the data compiled by the Delphi technique, measures of mean, mode, median, variance, and standard deviation were calculated at the end of Round 2 and each succeeding round. The responses of the two panels of experts and their ranking of the

compiled list of items form the basis for the analysis of this study, which is explained in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, data gathered by the Delphi Study are analyzed according to mean, mode, median, variance, and standard deviation. The analysis is compared to joint targeting process doctrine described in the literature and currently being used by SOF. The comparison is used as a basis to determine whether or not SOF are being effectively integrated into the joint targeting process. In Chapter 5, conclusions and recommendations for further study will be made based on the analysis.

Joint Targeting Process Doctrine

As with all cycles, the starting point is frequently hard to determine. In the case of the joint targeting process the purpose is to provide the commander with a method of connecting objectives with desired effects in order to shape his battle space (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, I1). This process is very flexible in allowing the commander the ability to affect full spectrum operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, I1- I2). The joint targeting process was developed in order to establish guidelines to minimize the possibility of conflicting or duplicative procedures during military operations, and to provide component commanders a common understanding of the joint targeting process in order to achieve the desired effects to accomplish the mission (Moses 2001, 1-7).

The joint targeting process is based on six phases, which constitute a six-step decision-making process developed to aid commanders with developing war-fighting recommendations in order to support the JFC. This process provides the user a doctrinal

source to an analytical approach to problem solving. The six phases of the joint targeting process are shown in Figure 2. Each individual process will be discussed in order to gain an appreciation for the entire doctrinal process.




Figure 2. *Joint Targeting Cycle Phases* (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II2)

The joint targeting cycle is a systematic approach that supports operational planning and facilitates force employment in order to achieve the desired results as stated by the commander (Widhammer 2001, 8).

Step One--Commander's Objectives, Guidance, and Intent:

The commander's objectives set the conditions for targeting in each phase of the cycle. They are derived from as high up as the President of the United States and are developed through the chain of command (Moses 2001, 8-20). They should be both

quantifiable and unambiguous in order to be successful. Objectives and guidance give targeting officers a means to determine targeting priorities and provide the criteria for measuring mission success. Objectives should be understandable, observable, measurable, and achievable (Joint Pub 3-05.2 2001, I12). Guidance may consist of rules of engagement or policies that govern how objectives are pursued. It provides the framework to achieve the objectives and establishes the force employment scope and restrictions (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II1).

The mission of targeting is to get the right weapon on the right target at the right time in order to achieve a desired effect or a particular degree of change in enemy behavior. Without the characteristics of good, clear objectives, targeting will fail in achieving the desired effect.

Step Two--Target Development Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization:

Target development is the efficient evaluation of prospective target systems. It is the method by which we decide which targets are most likely to meet the objectives, as well as the specific nature, degree, and period of time of damage needed to inflict on those targets (Roberts 2001, 5-13). The goals of target development are to compile a list of prioritized targets, the destruction of which will cause the enemy's behavior to change as desired by the commander, and to determine the level of destruction and the time desired for which particular targets are to be neutralized.

Step Three--Capabilities Analysis:

This step matches particular weapons, fuses, and delivery parameters required to achieve the commander's objectives (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II5-II-7). The number one concern is to meet those objectives in order to change an enemy's desired behavior

(target system) by selecting the appropriate weapon to create that desired effect. It should be understood that weaponeering is not the same as targeting. Instead, it is a critical step within the process (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II5-II7). Additionally, unlike cost accounting, weaponeering solutions do not predict the effectiveness of any specific weapon.

Weaponeering solutions give an estimate of the expected performance.

Step Four--Commander's Decision and Force Assignment:

This step involves matching those targets on the JIPTL with military capability in order to comply with the objectives, guidance, and intent determined by the commander (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II7). The goal is to conduct effects-based targeting, which is not intended to reach solutions that favor the weapon but, instead, to select the most appropriate “tool” to accomplish the mission (Widhamer 2001, 13). At the operational level, force application calculations are extensively used in developing long-range plans, outlining time to complete particular phases of an operation, depicting how targets may be attacked, and providing a way to integrate and use various weapons (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II7).

Step Five--Mission Planning and Force Execution:

This step involves the preparation of the ATO, which gives details to components, subordinates, and command and control organizations in order to place specific capabilities and forces on their targets (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II7-II8). It provides the information required for subordinate elements, such as desired mean point of impact (DMPI) coordinates, weapons load, fusing, attack timing (for deconfliction), and combat assessment tasking. At this point, it is imperative for a task to contain a Basic

Encyclopedia (BE) number in order to guarantee the target receives the attention it deserves (Widhammer 2001, 13-14).

Step Six--Combat Assessment:

Finally, military operations are assessed to collect and interpret targeting results, help formulate subsequent battle plans, collect valuable empirical data on weapon system performance, and serve as a benchmark for validating whether targeting results accomplished the objectives (Joint Pub 3-60 2002, II8-II10). Combat assessment (assessment of military operations) is composed of three functions: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effect assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendations (RR) (Widhammer 2001, 14-15).

BDA consists of three areas of analysis: physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and systemic assessment (Grund 2001, 5-12). The intent of physical damage assessment is to determine what effect a weapon had on a target's physical structure, usually expressed in a quantitative percentage. Functional damage assessment combines the data from physical damage assessment with information from other sources to determine the functionality of the target. Systemic assessment combines the functional damage assessment with knowledge of the enemy system. The intent is to determine to what extent damaging the target degraded the enemy system as a whole. This final assessment will ultimately determine the extent that the objective was achieved.

The final element of combat assessment is Reattack Recommendations RR (Grund 2001, 12). BDA generally initiates RR by identifying targets that have not been sufficiently neutralized. Tactics, penetration aids, enemy and friendly countermeasures,

and the reasons for initial failure are considered by the targeteers prior to recommending a target for reattack.

The combat assessment process is an important means to determine the efficiency of targeting efforts to achieve the objectives of the commander. The overall effectiveness of munitions is monitored and re-attack recommendations are made to ensure constant movement toward mission success (Grund 2001, 14).

SOLE Doctrine

The SOLE is a joint organization made up of soldiers, airmen, and sailors with expertise in SOF procedures who work with the JFACC staff to ensure that deconfliction and proper integration at all phases of an operation are properly coordinated and planned for, with the aim of fratricide prevention (Joint Pub 3-05.2 2001, II14). The SOLE provides SOF liaisons to the JFACC or to the appropriate service component by integrating directly into the JAOC and becoming part of the team developing the air and space battle plan.

The SOLE reports directly to the JFSOCC and coordinates with all JFSOCC components. The SOLE coordinates and synchronizes SOF air and surface operations with joint air operations with liaison officers throughout the JAOC staff (HQ AFSOC DOXP 1997, 3). Even though the SOLE occupies space in the JFACC's JAOC it is important to remember that it works directly for the JFSOCC in coordination with the JSOAC. This is critical because today's battlefield is three dimensional, which causes a heightened chance for fratricide. Because the JFACC and JFSOCC share a common interest in the deep battlefield, this requires that SOF assets be incorporated into joint air operations planning and execution in order to provide synchronization and deconfliction

(Joint Pub 3-05.2 2001, II14-II15). The SOLE increases the probability for success in special operations missions, and reduces the possibility of fratricide to those operating deep within the battlespace.

The SOLE must consider airborne fire support and reconnaissance command and control platforms, and aerial refueling, as well as deconfliction of deep battlefield operations. Specific functions include ATO and ACO generation, real-time mission support within the JAOC, operations and intelligence support for targeting, combat airspace control for prevention of fratricide, coordination with special plans functions, and coordination with the Joint Search and Rescue Center (United States Special Operations Command 1998).

Contributions on How SOF Can Be More Effectively Integrated
into the Joint Targeting Process

An initial questionnaire for soliciting a list of recommendations on how SOF can be more effectively integrated into the joint targeting process was developed. Prompts which included “increase,” “decrease,” “promote,” “abolish,” and “keep,” were used to help stimulate thought and not materially stifle creative thinking among members of the Delphi panel of experts. The initial questionnaire and an explanation of the study were sent with a cover letter to each panelist (Appendix G and C). A total of 160 recommendations were generated from the panel with this instrument. Several panelists contributed more than one recommendation in response to particular prompts. Findings will be sent, along with a token of gratitude, to each panelist.

The total number of recommendations generated by the questionnaire exceeded the number suggested in the literature. Therefore, the list of 160 recommendations was

reduced to ninety-three in the following process. First, recommendations which did not strictly comply with the instructions on the initial questionnaire were discarded. Second, recommendations which were outside the definition of SOF and the joint targeting process were set aside for future study. Being careful not to materially alter the original language and concept of the remaining recommendations, those with similar language and ideas were consolidated. The analyses of the summaries of individual responses were grouped according to the particular measurement to which they belonged (tables 1-8).

Finally, the analyses of the responses of field-based personnel and institutional-based personnel on the panel were compared for each question. Following is an individual analysis of each recommendation, comparing mean, mode, median, standard deviation, and variance for field-based personnel and institutional-based personnel.

Table 1. How are Special Operations Forces presently integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?

<i>How are Special Operations Forces presently integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>				Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree					
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Special Operations Liaison Element.	6	3	1	2. 5	3	3	2. 51	6. 33	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Joint Targeting Control Board.	6	3	1	2. 5	3	3	2. 51	6. 33	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process by nominating Special Operations targets to the Joint Targeting Control Board.	1	7	2	2. 9	3	3	3. 21	10. 3	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase I, (Commander's objectives, guidance and intent) of the targeting process.	2	4	3	1	2. 7	3	3	1. 29	1. 66
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase III, (Capabilities analysis) of the targeting process.	1	4	4	1	2. 5	2. 5	2. 5	1. 73	3

<i>How are Special Operations Forces presently integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?</i>								Variance	
								SD	
								Mode	
								Median	
								Mean	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process at the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	3	5	1	1	3	3	3	1. 91	3. 66
Special Operations Forces are represented on the Joint Targeting Control Board just like any other major subordinate command.	2	2	6		2. 6	2	2	2. 30	5. 33
Special Operations Forces are presently developing their own sources and choosing their targets with the approval of the commanding general.	3	5	2		3. 1	3	3	1. 52	2. 33

<i>How are Special Operations Forces presently integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?</i>								Variance	
								SD	
								Mode	
								Median	
								Mean	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Special Operations Liaison Element.	7	2	1	1	2. 6	3	3	3. 21	10. 3
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Joint Targeting Control Board.	4	4	2	2	2. 2	3	2,3	1. 15	1. 33
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process by nominating Special Operations targets to the Joint Targeting Control Board.	1	4	3	2	2. 4	2. 5	3	1. 29	1. 66
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase I, (Commander's objectives, guidance and intent) of the targeting process.	6	3	1	1	2. 5	3	3	2. 51	6. 33
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase III, (Capabilities analysis) of the targeting process.	8	2			2. 8	3	3	4. 24	18
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process at the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	5	4	1	1	2. 4	2. 5	3	2. 08	4. 33
Special Operations Forces are represented on the Joint Targeting Control Board just like any other major subordinate command.	6	2	2	2	2. 4	3	3	2. 30	5. 33
Special Operations Forces are presently developing their own sources and choosing their targets with the approval of the commanding general.	7	3			2. 7	3	3	2. 82	8

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “SOF are represented on the JTCB just like any other major subordinate command.” Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “SOP are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the JTCB,” and “at the JSOTF.” They are neutral about “SOF are presently integrated into the joint targeting process by nominating Special Operations targets to the JTCB.” There may be, in some cases, a question as to the meaning of this statement. Some respondents may have assumed that the question was asking where the initial integration takes place, while other respondents may have assumed that, if the integration has been initiated earlier on the joint targeting cycle, it continues to be integrated from then on in the cycle.

Table 2. What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?

<i>What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree					
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to deconflict air to ground Special Operations Forces to prevent fratricide.	4	3	3	3. 1	3	4	0. 57	0. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary planning to fully integrate Special Operations Forces.		3	6	1	2. 2	2	2	2. 51
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for all targeting functions for Special Operations Forces.		2	6	2	2	2	2. 30	5. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for ensuring the Special Operations Forces component target list make it to the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	1	6	2	1	2. 7	3	3	2. 38
								5. 66

<i>What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to provide the Joint Targeting Control Board with Special Operations Forces capabilities and limitations.	6	3	1	2. 5	3	3	2. 51	6. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to issue warning orders to the Special Operations Component Force.	1	6	3	1. 8	2	2	2. 51	6. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is air-ground coordination with supporting air elements/commands in order to enhance mission accomplishment.	2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24	18
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is continuous tracking of all US/Coalition SOF air-ground elements.	2	7	1	3. 1	3	3	3. 21	10. 3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is deliberate planning and coordination with Joint Force Air Component Command and the Joint Special Operations Air Component in support of planned Special Operations Force missions in order to obtain and ensure proper air support in terms of Close Air Support, intelligence and electronic warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, Combat Search and Rescue, and other air assets included in the Master Air Attack Plan.	2	6	2	3	3	3	2. 30	5. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is immediate planning and deconfliction as required during the prosecution of Time Sensitive Targets.	4	5	1	3. 2	3	3	2. 08	4. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is designed to coordinate personnel recovery and unconventional assisted recovery.	7	2	1	2. 6	3	3	3. 21	10. 3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the air tasking order and Airspace Control Order.	2	8		2. 2	2	2	4. 24	18
The Special Operations Liaison Element has no role in the joint targeting process.	1	3	6	1. 5	1	1	2. 51	6. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to ensure the appropriate Special Operation targets are integrated into the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	2	5	3	2. 9	3	3	1. 52	2. 33

<i>What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>								
	Strongly Disagree			Mean			Mode		Variance
Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Mean	Median	Mode	SD			
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to deconflict air to ground Special Operations Forces to prevent fratricide.	3	7		3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary planning to fully integrate Special Operations Forces.	1	4	4	1	2. 5	2. 5	2,3	1. 73	3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for all targeting functions for Special Operations Forces.		5	3	2	2. 3	2. 5	3	1. 52	2. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for ensuring the Special Operations Forces component target list make it to the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	1	6	1	3	2. 7	3	3	2. 36	5. 58
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to provide the Joint Targeting Control Board with Special Operations Forces capabilities and limitations.		8	2		2. 8	3	3	4. 24	18
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to issue warning orders to the Special Operations Component Force.			7	3	1. 7	2	2	2. 82	8
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is air-ground coordination with supporting air elements/commands in order to enhance mission accomplishment.	4	6			3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is continuous tracking of all US/Coalition SOF air-ground elements.	3	7			3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is deliberate planning and coordination with Joint Force Air Component Command and the Joint Special Operations Air Component in support of planned Special Operations Force missions in order to obtain and ensure proper air support in terms of Close Air Support, intelligence and electronic warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, Combat Search and Rescue, and other air assets included in the Master Air Attack Plan.		3	5	2	3. 1	3	3	1. 52	2. 33
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is immediate planning and deconfliction as required during the prosecution of Time Sensitive Targets.	2	7	1		3. 1	3	3	3. 21	10. 3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is designed to coordinate personnel recovery and unconventional assisted recovery.		5	5		2. 5	2. 5	2,3	0	0

<i>What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>							Variance
	SD	Mode	Median	Mean	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the air tasking order and Airspace Control Order.	1	8	1	3	3	3	4. 04	16. 3
The Special Operations Liaison Element has no role in the joint targeting process.		1	3	6	1. 5	1	1	2. 51
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to ensure the appropriate Special Operation targets are integrated into the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	6	1	3	3. 3	4	4	2. 51	6. 33

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “The role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary planning to fully integrate SOF,” “to be responsible for all targeting functions for SOF,” “to issue warning orders to the SOF,” “to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the ATO and Airspace Control Order,” and “The SOLE has no role in the joint targeting process.” Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements except “The role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process is to be responsible for all targeting functions for SOF,” “to issue warning orders to the SOF,” and “The SOLE has no role in the joint targeting process.” They were neutral on “The role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary to fully integrate SOF.” The only serious difference of opinion between the two groups on the panel concerned the role of the SOLE in the joint tasking process to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the ATO and airspace control order.

Table 3. Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?

<i>Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?</i>	FIELD BASED				Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
Special Forces personnel (Master Sergeants and Majors) who are educated in the process of Special Operations Liaison Element should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element.	3	7			3.3	3	3	2.82	8
Nine ground Special Operations Forces personnel are sufficient to man the Special Operations Liaison Element.		4	5	1	2.3	2	2	2.08	4.33
The required allocation of slots recommended by regulation for the Special Operations Liaison Element should be filled.	4	6			3.4	3	3	1.41	2
Manning of the Special Operations Liaison Element should be reduced.			4	6	1.4	1	1	1.41	2
Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCOORD) and J3(G3) Air should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process	2	4	4		2.8	3	2,3	1.15	1.33
Special Forces Noncommissioned Officers who are assigned to the Special Operations Liaison Element do not have the necessary rank to interact within the Air Operations Center.	1	1	7	1	2.2	2	2	3	9
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by field artillery personnel and aviation personnel to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.	1	6	2	1	2.7	3	3	2.38	5.66
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by the battlefield coordination detachment to help provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.	1	4	4	1	2.5	2,3	2,3	1.73	3
Theater Special Operations Commands have a targeting section in the J5 or J35 to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			7	2	1	2.6	3	3	3.21
Standing targeting personnel with the proper training should be assigned to Theater Special Operations Commands / Special Operations Liaison Element to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.	2	8			3.2	3	3	4.24	18
Military academic institutions should educate students on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.	6	4			3.6	4	4	1.41	2
Identified 18 series personnel who might work as targeteers should attend the Joint Targeting School to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.	8	2			3.8	4	4	4.24	18

<i>Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?</i>		Variance	Variance				
		SD	SD				
		Mode	Mode				
		Median	Median				
		Mean	Mean				
FIELD BASED		7	3	3.7	4	4	2.82 8
Special Operations Forces need increased education in the joint targeting process to understand how targets are identified by the tactical ground elements and how they are placed on the Joint Integrated Priority Target List.							

<i>Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?</i>		Variance	Variance				
		SD	SD				
		Mode	Mode				
		Median	Median				
		Mean	Mean				
INSTITUTIONAL BASED							
Special Forces personnel (Master Sergeants and Majors) who are educated in the process of Special Operations Liaison Element should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element.		7	2	1	3.5	4	3.21 10.3
Nine ground Special Operations Forces personnel are sufficient to man the Special Operations Liaison Element.		3	3	4	1.9	2	0.57 0.33
The required allocation of slots recommended by regulation for the Special Operations Liaison Element should be filled.		7	3		3.7	4	2.82 8
Manning of the Special Operations Liaison Element should be reduced.			2	8	1.2	1	4.24 18
Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCOORD) and J3(G3) Air should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process		5	4	1	2.9	2.5	4 2.08 4.33
Special Forces Noncommissioned Officers who are assigned to the Special Operations Liaison Element do not have the necessary rank to interact within the Air Operations Center.		8		2	2.6	4	3 4.24 18
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by field artillery personnel and aviation personnel to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.		7	2	1	2.6	3	3.21 10.3
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by the battlefield coordination detachment to help provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.		6	4		2.6	3	1.41 2

<i>Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?</i>	INSTITUTIONAL BASED	Mean			Median	Mode	SD	Variance	
		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
Theater Special Operations Commands have a targeting section in the J5 or J35 to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.		4	3	3	2.1	2	3	0.57	0.33
Standing targeting personnel with the proper training should be assigned to Theater Special Operations Commands / Special Operations Liaison Element to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.		7	3		3.7	4	4	2.82	8
Military academic institutions should educate students on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.		9	1		3.9	4	4	5.65	32
Identified 18 series personnel who might work as targeteers should attend the Joint Targeting School to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.		8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces need increased education in the joint targeting process to understand how targets are identified by the tactical ground elements and how they are placed on the Joint Integrated Priority Target List.		9	1		3.9	4	4	5.65	32

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “Nine ground SOF Personnel are sufficient to man the SOLE,” “Manning of the SOLE should be reduced,” and ‘SFNCO’s who are assigned to the SOLE do not have the necessary rank to interact within the Air Operations Center.” Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements except “Nine ground SOF Personnel are sufficient to man the SOLE,” and “Theater Special Operations Commands have a targeting section in the J5 or J35 to improve integration of SOF into the Joint Targeting Process.” The two groups on the panel could not reach agreement on these same responses.

Table 4. Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?

<i>Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
Strongly Agree	2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24	18
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are technology dependent and must have the ability to communicate across the full spectrum of the battlefield.	1	9		3. 1	3	3	5. 65	32
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the Air Defense Operations Center Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) which has the potential to integrate all targeting (planned/unplanned) and can enable parallel target planning and execution real time for the entire joint community.		9	1	2. 8	3	3	5. 65	32
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure the Special Operations Commander has direct access to the Special Operations Liaison Element 24/7.	2	7	1	3. 1	3	3	3. 21	10. 3
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to give Special Operations Forces their own close air support and air interdiction capability (Jets).	3	6	1	2. 5	2	2	2. 51	6. 33
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the development of a "fusion cell" located at the Joint Force Commanders Headquarters with the responsibility of targeting.	3	6	1	3. 1	3	3	2. 51	6. 33
No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.		5	5	1. 5	1. 5	1,2	0	0
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to have the Special Operations Liaison Element linked to the Special Operations Command and Control Element located with the Joint Force Land Component Commander.	1	6	2	1	2. 7	3	2. 38	5. 66

<i>Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>							Variance
							SD
							Mode
							Median
Mean							
Strongly Disagree							
Disagree							
Agree							
Strongly Agree	2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process need to be clearly prioritized between the Joint Force Air and Joint Force Special Operations.							18
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to communicate the location of Special Operations Forces throughout the Joint Operational Area. This does not mean sharing with allied nations or with everyone in the Air Operations Center.	1	5	2	1	2. 4	3	1. 89
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure that SOF have blue force trackers to prevent fratricide.	1	6	2	1	2. 7	3	2. 38
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure Special Operations Tactical Teams have the ability to communicate at all times in the event of a Time Sensitive Target.	2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to decrease the level required for approval authority of Special Operations Missions.							18

<i>Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>							Variance
							SD
							Mode
							Median
Mean							
Strongly Disagree							
Disagree							
Agree							
Strongly Agree	6	3	1	3. 5	4	4	2. 51
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are technology dependent and must have the ability to communicate across the full spectrum of the battlefield.							6. 33
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are available through the use of a communication chat tool.	1	5	4	2. 7	3	3	2. 08
							4. 33

<i>Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>								Variance	
INSTITUTIONAL BASED									
Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Mean	Median	Mode	SD		
				1	3	3	4.04	16.3	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the Air Defense Operations Center Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) which has the potential to integrate all targeting (planned/unplanned) and can enable parallel target planning and execution real time for the entire joint community.	1	8	1	3	3	3	4.24	18	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure the Special Operations Commander has direct access to the Special Operations Liaison Element 24/7.	2	8		3.2	3	3	2.51	6.33	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to give Special Operations Forces their own close air support and air interdiction capability (Jets).	6	3	1	3.1	4	4	2.51	6.33	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the development of a "fusion cell" located at the Joint Force Commanders Headquarters with the responsibility of targeting	6	3	1	3.5	4	4	2.51	6.33	
No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.	1	3	6	1.5	1	1	2.51	6.33	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to have the Special Operations Liaison Element linked to the Special Operations Command and Control Element located with the Joint Force Land Component Commander.	4	6		2.4	2	2	1.41	2	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process need to be clearly prioritized between the Joint Force Air and Joint Force Special Operations.	1	0		3	3	3	0	0	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to communicate the location of Special Operations Forces throughout the Joint Operational Area. This does not mean sharing with allied nations or with everyone in the Air Operations Center.	3	4	3	3	3	3	0.57	0.33	

<i>Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>								Variance		
			Mean		Median		Mode		SD	
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree				
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure that Special Operations Forces have blue force trackers to prevent fratricide.	5	2	3	3.2	3.5	4	1.52	2.33		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure Special Operations Tactical Teams have the ability to communicate at all times in the event of a Time Sensitive Target.	4	6		3.4	3	3	1.41	2		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to decrease the level required for approval authority of Special Operations Missions.	5	2	3	3.2	3.5	4	1.52	2.33		

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “Alternative tactics, techniques and procedures available to improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process is to give SOF their own close air support and air interdiction capability,” and “No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process.” Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements except “No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process.” The two groups on the panel could not reach agreement on “Alternative tactics, techniques and procedures available to improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process is to give SOF their own close air support and air interdiction capability.”

Table 5. At what point in the Joint Targeting Process are Special Operations Forces considered a viable and tactical weapons system?

<i>At what point in the Joint Targeting Process are Special Operations Forces considered a viable and tactical weapons system?</i>	FIELD BASED					Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree						
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.	1	4	4	1	2.5	2.5	2,3	1.73	3	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.	1	5	3	1	2.6	3	3	1.91	3.66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase III, Capabilities analysis.	1	6	2	1	2.7	3	3	2.38	5.66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.	2	5	2	1	2.8	3	3	1.73	3	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.	2	6	1	1	2.9	3	3	2.38	5.66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase VI, Combat assessment.	2	5	2	1	2.8	3	3	1.73	3	
Special Operations Forces are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system.			7	3	1.7	2	2	2.82	8	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system normally after Special Operations Forces are on the ground.	1	6	2	1	2.7	3	3	2.38	5.66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only when airpower cannot do the job.	1	3	4	2	2.3	2	2	1.29	1.66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when other components identify a need.		5	4	1	2.4	2.5	3	2.08	4.33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when a high profile target of operational or strategic significance is identified by the Joint Force Commander.	4	4	2		3.2	3.5	3,4	1.15	1.33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only as an afterthought.	1	1	6	2	2.1	2	2	2.38	5.66	

<i>At what point in the Joint Targeting Process are Special Operations Forces considered a viable and tactical weapons system?</i>	<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>					Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree						
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.	1	7	1	1	2. 8	3	3	3	9	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.	1	3	5	1	2. 4	2	2	1. 91	3. 66	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase III, Capabilities analysis.	1	4	5		2. 6	2. 5	2	2. 08	4. 33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.	1	4	5		2. 6	2. 5	2	2. 08	4. 33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.	1	9			3. 1	3	3	5. 65	32	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase VI, Combat assessment.	2	7	1		3. 1	3	3	3. 21	10. 3	
Special Operations Forces are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system.	1	2	5	2	2. 2	2	2	1. 73	3	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system normally after Special Operations Forces are on the ground.	1	3	6		2. 5	2	2	2. 51	6. 33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only when airpower cannot do the job.		6	2	2	2. 4	3	3	2. 30	5. 33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when other components identify a need.	2	6	2		3	3	3	2. 30	5. 33	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when a high profile target of operational or strategic significance is identified by the Joint Force Commander.	4	6			3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only as an afterthought.	1	5	2	2	2. 5	3	3	1. 73	3	

There was a great deal of disagreement concerning this statement. About half of the members of the panel disagreed with the recommendations made by their peers. Generally, field-based personnel disagreed with “SOF are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system,” “are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only when air power cannot do the job,” “when other components identify a need,” only as an

afterthought.” Institutional-based personnel disagreed with “SOF are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase II, Target development, validation nomination, and prioritization,” “are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system,” “are considered a viable and tactical weapons system normally after SOF are on the ground.” The two groups on the panel could not agree on six out of fourteen recommendations pertaining to this question.

Table 6. Where and when should Special Operations Forces be applied in the Joint Targeting Process?

<i>Where and when should Special Operations Forces be applied in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>				Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree					
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.	4	6			3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.	5	5			3. 5	3. 5	3,4	0	0
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase III, Capabilities analysis.	5	5			3. 5	3. 5	3,4	0	0
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.	4	6			3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.	4	6			3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase VI, Combat assessment.	3	7			3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process immediately and Special Operations Forces should be listed on the Air Tasking Order by target number.	3	5	2		3. 1	3	3	1. 52	2. 33
Targeting should take place in the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	2	6	2		3	3	3	2. 30	5. 33
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process.	3	7			3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8

<i>Where and when should Special Operations Forces be applied in the Joint Targeting Process?</i>	<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.	7	3		3.7	4	4	2.82	8
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase III, Capabilities analysis.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase VI, Combat assessment.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process immediately and Special Operations Forces should be listed on the Air Tasking Order by target number.	7	1	2	3.5	4	4	3.21	10.3
Targeting should take place in the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	7	2	1	3.6	4	4	3.21	10.3
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18

Both groups were unanimously in favor of all recommendations pertaining to this question.

Table 7. Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?

<i>Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
The joint targeting process should be modified by listing all Special Operations Targets on the Air Tasking Order.	1	6	3	2.8	3	3	2.51	6.33

<i>Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>						Variance		
	SD	Mode	Median	Mean	Strongly Disagree	Disagree			
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the responsiveness to Time Sensitive Targets.	7	3		3. 7	4	4	2. 82	8	
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the technology across the joint community to allow inter-communications.	4	6		3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2	
The joint targeting process should be streamlined.	5	5		3. 5	3. 5	3.4	0	0	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow equal consideration for all assets and components in every step of the targeting process.	4	4	2	3. 2	3	3.4	1. 15	1. 33	
The joint targeting process is currently based on an air-centric approach.	6	3	1	3. 5	4	4	2. 51	6. 33	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow Liaison Officers the ability to represent their components.	2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24	18	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow for the training of personnel prior to employment.	1	9		3. 1	3	3	5. 65	32	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow the targeting to be conducted at the Joint Task Force level.	2	6	2	3	3	3	2. 30	5. 33	
The joint targeting process should be modified to provide a rapid response from dedicated ground support aircraft.	3	6	1	3. 2	3	3	2. 51	6. 33	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow all Special Operations Aircraft to automatically appear on the Air Tasking Order.		5	4	1	2. 4	3	3	2. 08	4. 33
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to compartmentalize Special Operations Activities.	1	5	3	1	2. 6	3	3	1. 91	3. 66
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow additional education on the joint targeting process.	1	7	2	2. 9	3	3	3. 21	10. 3	
The joint targeting process should not be modified.	1	5	4	1. 8	2	2	2. 08	4. 33	
The joint targeting process should not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.	1	7	2	2	2	2	3. 21	10. 3	

<i>Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?</i>	<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>						Variance	
	SD	Mode	Median	Mean	Strongly Disagree	Disagree		
The joint targeting process should be modified by listing all Special Operations Targets on the Air Tasking Order.	2	5	3	2. 9	3	3	1. 52	2. 33
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the responsiveness to Time Sensitive Targets.	7	3		3. 7	4	4	2. 82	8
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the technology across the joint community to allow inter-communications.	3	7		3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8
The joint targeting process should be streamlined.	2	6	2	3	3	3	2. 30	5. 33

<i>Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?</i>								Variance	
<u>INSTITUTIONAL BASED</u>									
			Mean	Median	Mode	SD			
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow equal consideration for all assets and components in every step of the targeting process.	3	5	2	3.1	3	3	1.52	2.33	
The joint targeting process is currently based on an air-centric approach.	8	2		3.8	4	4	4.24	18	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow Liaison Officers the ability to represent their components.	2	2	6	2.6	2	2	2.30	5.33	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow for the training of personnel prior to employment.	4	6		3.4	3	3	1.41	2	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow the targeting to be conducted at the Joint Task Force level.	1	7	1	1	2.8	3	3	9	
The joint targeting process should be modified to provide a rapid response from dedicated ground support aircraft.	2	7	1	3.1	3	3	3.21	10.3	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow all Special Operations Aircraft to automatically appear on the Air Tasking Order.	2	6	2	3	3	3	2.30	5.33	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to compartmentalize Special Operations Activities.		3	6	1	2.2	2	2.51	6.33	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow additional education on the joint targeting process.	2	7	1	3.1	3	3	3.21	10.3	
The joint targeting process should not be modified.	1	4	5	1.7	1.5	1	2.08	4.33	
The joint targeting process should not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.		2	3	5	1.7	1.5	1	1.52	2.33

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow all Special Operations Aircraft to automatically appear on the Air Tasking Order,” “The joint targeting process should not be modified,” and “The Joint Targeting Process should not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.” Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except “The joint targeting process should be modified to allow liaison officers the ability to represent their components,” “to compartmentalize Special Operations Activities,” “should not be modified,” and “should

not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.” The two groups on the panel could not agree on three of the fifteen recommendations.

Table 8. Should other factors be considered to integrate Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?

<i>Should other factors be considered to integrate Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?</i>	<u>FIELD BASED</u>			Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree					
More training and education for Conventional Forces to understand Special Operations capabilities are needed in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	2	7	1	3.1	3	3	3.21	10.3
The Special Operations Liaison Element should be properly manned in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	3	7		3.3	3	3	2.82	8
A cell should be established in the Special Operations staff in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		9	1	2.9	3	3	5.65	32
The Battlefield Coordination Detachment should be taught more about the nature and methods of Special Operation employment in order to better integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	2	8		3.2	3	3	4.24	18
Special Operations personnel should be school trained in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	2	8		3.2	3	3	4.24	18
Special Operations personnel should be trained on the measures of effectiveness of Special Operations lethal and non-lethal targeting effects in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	4	6		3.4	3	3	1.41	2
United States Special Operations Command must push to refine command and control augmentation for Theater Special Operations Commands in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	3	6	1	3.2	3	3	2.51	6.33
Rehearsals must be factored into the targeting process in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.	2	8		3.2	3	3	4.24	18
Since Special Operations Forces are a finite resource, planning considerations for reconstituting them need to be factored in order to fully integrate them into the joint targeting process.	4	5	1	3.3	3	3	2.08	4.33

					Mean	Median	Mode	SD	Variance
		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree				
More training and education for Conventional Forces to understand Special Operations capabilities are needed in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
The Special Operations Liaison Element should be properly manned in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
A cell should be established in the Special Operations staff in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		2	4	3	2. 6	3	3	1	1
The Battlefield Coordination Detachment should be taught more about the nature and methods of Special Operation employment in order to better integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		3	7		3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8
Special Operations personnel should be school trained in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		3	7		3. 3	3	3	2. 82	8
Special Operations personnel should be trained on the measures of effectiveness of Special Operations lethal and non-lethal targeting effects in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
United States Special Operations Command must push to refine command and control augmentation for Theater Special Operations Commands in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		3. 4	3	3	1. 41	2
Rehearsals must be factored into the targeting process in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		1	3	6	2. 5	2	2	2. 51	6. 33
Since Special Operations Forces are a finite resource, planning considerations for reconstituting them need to be factored in order to fully integrate them into the joint targeting process.		2	8		3. 2	3	3	4. 24	18

Generally, field-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements.

Institutional-based personnel tend to agree with all of the above statements, except

“Rehearsals must be factored into the targeting process in order to integrate SOF into the joint targeting process.”

There is a high level of correlation between the responses of field-based and institutional-based personnel to the Likert Scale. Both groups registered seventy-three positive responses. Field-based personnel registered eighteen negative responses and institutional-based personnel registered seventeen negative responses. There were twenty-four differences of opinion among the responses from each group on individual recommendations. However, none of the differences exceeded 0.8 on the mean calculation for the response and all centered near the midpoint. Since the Likert Scale was designed for no middle or noncommittal response, it is easy to understand how individuals would select options immediately to the right or the left of an imaginary midpoint if they truly had no opinion one way or the other concerning the recommendation. Based on statistical analysis, the two groups on the panel, for the most part, may be considered as being from the same population. Therefore, the conclusions to this study are based on the collective responses of both the field-based and institutional-based personnel.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study was designed to determine how SOF can be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process. The data generated from the input of panelists through the use of the Delphi instrument for this study have been analyzed to address the following eight questions. Recommendations were ranked according to the strength of the affirmative responses based on the mean, mode, median, standard deviation, and variance. The strongest four recommendations answer the eight questions posed in chapter 3 and are used as a foundation to support the conclusion.

1. Based on published documents, how are SOF presently integrated into the joint targeting process?

SOF are presently developing their own sources and choosing their targets with the approval of the commanding general. They are integrated into the joint targeting process at the Joint Special Operations Task Force. They currently nominate Special Operations targets to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. Finally, they are integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase III through the SOLE.

2. According to published documents, what is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) in the joint targeting process?

The role of the SOLE in the joint targeting process is air-ground coordination with supporting air elements and commands in order to enhance mission accomplishment. This helps to deconflict air-to-ground SOF to prevent fratricide. The role is continuous tracking of all US and coalition SOF air-ground elements. Finally, to

the SOLE ensures that appropriate Special Operation targets are integrated into the JIPTL.

3. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, should additional land component personnel be allocated to the SOLE in order to provide the expertise necessary to more effectively integrate special operations land forces into the joint targeting process?

Initially, identified 18 series personnel who might work as targeteers should attend the Joint Targeting School to improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process. SOF need increased education in the joint targeting process to understand how targets are identified by the tactical ground elements and how they are placed on the JIPTL. Also, military academic institutions should educate students on SOF capabilities. Certainly, the required allocation of slots recommended by regulation for the SOLE should be filled.

4. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, what alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures are available for the more effective integration of SOF into the joint targeting process?

Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of SOF into the joint targeting process are technology dependent and must have the ability to communicate across the full spectrum of the battlefield. They need to be clearly prioritized between the Joint Air Force and Joint Special Operations Force. Special Operations tactical teams must have the ability to communicate at all times in the event of a time sensitive target. A "fusion cell" should be located at the JFC headquarters with

the responsibility of targeting. Also, the Special Operations commander must have direct access to the SOLE twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

5. According to published documents, at what point in the joint targeting process are SOF considered a viable and tactical weapons system?

SOF are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when a high profile target of operational or strategic significance is identified by the JFC during Phases III–IV of mission planning and force execution, as well as when other components identify a need.

6. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, where and when should SOF be applied in the joint targeting process?

SOF should be applied in the joint targeting process throughout Phases I–VI. Special Operations targeting should take place in the Joint Special Operations Task Force or the appropriate Special Operations component. Also, SOF should be applied in the joint targeting process immediately. SOF should also be listed on the ATO by target number.

7. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, how should the joint targeting process become modified for more effective utilization of SOF?

The joint targeting process should be modified and streamlined to increase the responsiveness to time-sensitive targets. It should be modified to increase the technology across the joint community to allow intercommunications and to allow for the training of personnel prior to employment. Finally, it should be modified to allow equal consideration for all assets and components in every step of the targeting process.

8. Based on the opinions of leaders who influence or implement military doctrine, are there other factors to consider concerning how SOF should be integrated more effectively into the joint targeting process?

Special Operations personnel should be trained in the measures of effectiveness of Special Operations lethal and nonlethal targeting effects in order to integrate SOF into the joint targeting process. Since SOF are a finite resource, planning considerations for reconstituting them need to be factored. More training and education for conventional forces to understand Special Operations capabilities are needed. Finally, United States Special Operations Command must push to refine command and control augmentation for theater Special Operations commands.

The evidence supports the conclusion that SOF should be integrated at every phase of the joint targeting process in very specific, as well as general, ways. Technological and political changes are taking place today that require that the US Army be prepared to fight in every conceivable environment and under any conceivable conditions and restraints. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq testify to the fact that SOF, with the proper integration into and the support of the joint targeting process, are truly indispensable on the battlefield, as well as before and after the conflict.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the findings of this study:

1. Based on supporting evidence, it is essential that SOF personnel be properly educated in lethal and nonlethal targeting processes. These personnel should attend a military academic institution which specializes in the targeting process, such as the Joint Targeting School located in Dam Neck, Virginia.

2. The allotted SOLE slots recommended in the regulations should be filled.
3. Technological articulation across the Armed Services is critical in order to achieve the interoperability needed for full spectrum combat operations.
4. A “fusion cell” should be developed in order to allow other government agencies to participate in the targeting process.
5. SOF should be considered a viable and tactical weapons system when conventional means cannot achieve the desired effect throughout the targeting process.
6. Targets nominated by the Special Operations component and delivered to the targeting cell should be walked through the targeting process by Special Operations personnel in order to facilitate their acceptance.
7. All Armed Service components need to be considered equally in the joint targeting process.
8. SOF targets should be assigned BE numbers and placed on the ATO.
9. A portion of instruction in the military academic institutions should be dedicated to Special Operations capabilities in order to train conventional officers and noncommissioned officers.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based on the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made for future research:

1. Study the effects of the physical location of planning headquarters with respect to the joint targeting process.

2. Analyze whether predetermined components of Special Operations ground forces with generic mission sets need to be apportioned in Phase I of the joint targeting process.
3. Study how SOF can increase responsiveness to time sensitive targets.
4. Examine the command and control augmentation for Theater Special Operations Command and how the targeting process is conducted.

APPENDIX A

LETTER OF INVITATION TO AN INDIVIDUAL PANELIST

Dear Sir:

I am currently working on a Masters thesis at the Command and General Staff College located in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. My thesis is, "How can Special Operations Forces (SOF) become better integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?" I am inviting you to participate as a member of a panel which will be asked questions concerning the doctrine, joint tactics techniques, and procedures utilized in the joint targeting process. The identity of panelists will be kept anonymous in order to maintain objectivity in the analysis of data.

I will use a Delphi Study to analyze the data generated in the research. When you choose to participate, you will be expected to respond at least three times. The first step will be to submit to the selected panel a list of questions concerning how SOF can become more effectively integrated into the joint targeting process. You will answer questions concerning the doctrine, joint tactics techniques, and procedures utilized in the joint targeting process. Next, members of the panel will be asked to indicate on a Likert-style Scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with the answers submitted to the questions. You will repeat the last step up to two more times in order to reach consensus concerning the level of agreement or disagreement with the answers. Finally, the data will be analyzed statistically to determine the mean, median, mode, variance, and standard deviation for each response. These statistics will serve as a basis for drawing conclusions about how SOF can become better integrated into the joint targeting process.

I have enclosed a consent form which I am asking you to use to indicate your willingness to participate. I will provide you with the necessary equipment and supplies to complete the project. Upon request, I will provide you with a copy of my thesis. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Johnny L. Hester

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX B

LETTER OF INVITATION ASKING FOR ASSISTANCE IN SETTING UP A PANEL.

Dear Sir:

I am currently working on a Masters thesis at the Command and General Staff College located in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. My thesis question is, "How can Special Operations Forces (SOF) become better integrated into the joint targeting process?" I am writing you to ask for assistance in setting up a panel which will be asked questions concerning the doctrine, joint tactics techniques, and procedures utilized in the joint targeting process. The identity of panelists will be kept anonymous in order to maintain objectivity in the analysis of data.

I will use a Delphi Study to analyze the data generated in the research. When your nominees choose to participate, they will be expected to respond at least three times. The first step will be for the panelists to submit answers to a list of questions concerning doctrine, joint tactics techniques, and procedures utilized in the joint targeting process. Next, members of the panel will be asked to indicate on a Likert-style Scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with the answers submitted to the questions. They will repeat the last step up to two more times in order to reach consensus concerning the level of agreement or disagreement with the answers. Finally, the data will be analyzed statistically to determine the mean, median, mode, variance, and standard deviation for each response. These statistics will serve as a basis for drawing conclusions about how SOF can become better integrated into the joint targeting process.

I have enclosed several nomination forms which I am asking you to send to prospective panelists asking them to indicate their willingness to participate. I will provide respondents with the necessary equipment and supplies to complete the project. Upon request, I will provide the panelists with a copy of my thesis. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Johnny L. Hester

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX C

COVER LETTER 1

Dear Sir:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study on how Special Operations Forces (SOF) can become better integrated into the Joint Targeting Process. As part of Step One, a questionnaire is enclosed which will be used to begin the Delphi Study. Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. Once the responses have been entered into the data base, Step Two will be sent to you. In order to ensure that your questionnaire is included in the data, it must be returned promptly. Your identity during this study will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Johnny L. Hester

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX D

COVER LETTER 2

Dear Sir:

Thank you for responding to Step One of the Delphi Study on how Special Operations Forces (SOF) can become better integrated into the joint targeting process. As part of Step Two, a Likert-style questionnaire is enclosed which will be used to quantify the Delphi Study. Please return the completed Likert-style questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. Once the responses have been entered into the data base, Step Three will be sent to you. In order to ensure that your questionnaire is included in the data, it must be returned promptly. Your identity during this study will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Johnny L. Hester

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX E

THANK YOU LETTER

Dear Sir:

Thank you for participating in the Delphi Study associated with my research concerning how Special Operations Forces (SOF) can become better integrated into the joint targeting process. Your input and timely responses have been invaluable to the success of this study. The results of this study will be mailed to you upon request. As always, your identity during this study will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Johnny L. Hester

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX F
CONSENT FORM

SUBJECT: Consent Form

(Date: _____)

Major Johnny L. Hester (SF)
325-4 Pope Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Dear MAJ. Hester,

I agree to participate in your study on how Special Operations Forces (SOF) can become more effectively integrated into the joint targeting process. I understand that my identity will be kept strictly confidential.

Name: _____

Rank: _____

Organization: _____

Service / Branch: _____

Contact Information:

Mailing Address: _____

Email: _____

Telephone#: _____

Survey Control
03-018
CGSC - DAD

APPENDIX G

QUESTIONNAIRE IN SUPPORT OF MMAS RESEARCH

Thank you for participating in this study. Your identity will be kept strictly confidential. Please feel free to insert additional pages in order to complete your responses. Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope or e-mail responses to johnny.hester@us.army.mil.

1. How are Special Operations Forces presently integrated into the Joint Targeting Process?
2. What is the role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the Joint Targeting Process?
3. Should additional land component personnel be allocated to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, who and how many?
4. Are alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?
5. At what point in the Joint Targeting Process are Special Operations Forces considered a viable and tactical weapons system?
6. Where and when should Special Operations Forces be applied in the Joint Targeting Process?
7. Should the Joint Targeting Process be modified for Special Operations Forces? If so, how?
8. Should other factors be considered to integrate Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process? If so, what are they?

Survey Control # 03-018 CGSC - DAD
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APPENDIX H

LIKERT SCALE (FIELD BASED)					Survey Control # 03-018 CGSC - DAD
Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree		
Instructions: This is Phase 2 of the Delphi Study. On this modified Likert Scale, indicate by placing an "X" in the appropriate column to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements which were generated by the panel of experts during Phase 1.					
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Special Operations Liaison Element.		6	3	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Joint Targeting Control Board.		6	3	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process by nominating Special Operations targets to the Joint Targeting Control Board.	1	7	2		
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase I, (Commander's objectives, guidance and intent) of the targeting process.	2	4	3	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase III, (Capabilities analysis) of the targeting process.	1	4	4	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process at the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	3	5	1	1	
Special Operations Forces are represented on the Joint Targeting Control Board just like any other major subordinate command.	2	2	6		
Special Operations Forces are presently developing their own sources and choosing their targets with the approval of the commanding general.	3	5	2		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to deconflict air to ground Special Operations Forces to prevent fratricide.	4	3	3		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary planning to fully integrate Special Operations Forces.		3	6	1	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for all targeting functions for Special Operations Forces.		2	6	2	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for ensuring the Special Operations Forces component target list make it to the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	1	6	2	1	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to provide the Joint Targeting Control Board with Special Operations Forces capabilities and limitations.		6	3	1	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to issue warning orders to the Special Operations Component Force.		1	6	3	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is air-ground coordination with supporting air elements/commands in order to enhance mission accomplishment.	2	8			
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is continuous tracking of all US/Coalition SOF air-ground elements.	2	7	1		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		2	6	2	
	The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is deliberate planning and coordination with Joint Force Air Component Command and the Joint Special Operations Air Component in support of planned Special Operations Force missions in order to obtain and ensure proper air support in terms of Close Air Support, intelligence and electronic warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, Combat Search and Rescue, and other air assets included in the Master Air Attack Plan.				
	The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is immediate planning and deconfliction as required during the prosecution of Time Sensitive Targets.	4	5		1
	The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is designed to coordinate personnel recovery and unconventional assisted recovery.		7	2	1
	The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the air tasking order and Airspace Control Order.		2	8	
	The Special Operations Liaison Element has no role in the joint targeting process		1	3	6
	The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to ensure the appropriate Special Operation targets are integrated into the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	2	5	3	
	Special Forces personnel (Master Sergeants and Majors) who are educated in the process of Special Operations Liaison Element should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element.	3	7		
	Nine ground Special Operations Forces personnel are sufficient to man the Special Operations Liaison Element.		4	5	1
	The required allocation of slots recommended by regulation for the Special Operations Liaison Element should be filled.	4	6		
	Manning of the Special Operations Liaison Element should be reduced.			4	6
	Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCOORD) and J3(G3) Air should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process	2	4	4	
	Special Forces Noncommissioned Officers who are assigned to the Special Operations Liaison Element do not have the necessary rank to interact within the Air Operations Center.	1	1	7	1
	Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by field artillery personnel and aviation personnel to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.	1	6	2	1
	Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by the battlefield coordination detachment to help provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.	1	4	4	1
	Theater Special Operations Commands have a targeting section in the J5 or J35 to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.		7	2	1
	Standing targeting personnel with the proper training should be assigned to Theater Special Operations Commands / Special Operations Liaison Element to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.	2	8		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Strongly Agree	Agree				
Military academic institutions should educate students on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.	6	4			
Identified 18 series personnel who might work as targeteers should attend the Joint Targeting School to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.	8	2			
Special Operations Forces need increased education in the joint targeting process to understand how targets are identified by the tactical ground elements and how they are placed on the Joint Integrated Priority Target List.	7	3			
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are technology dependent and must have the ability to communicate across the full spectrum of the battlefield.	2	8			
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are available through the use of a communication chat tool.	1	9			
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the Air Defense Operations Center Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) which has the potential to integrate all targeting (planned/unplanned) and can enable parallel target planning and execution real time for the entire joint community.			9		1
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure the Special Operations Commander has direct access to the Special Operations Liaison Element 24/7.	2	7	1		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to give Special Operations Forces their own close air support and air interdiction capability (Jets).	3		6	1	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the development of a "fusion cell" located at the Joint Force Commanders Headquarters with the responsibility of targeting.	3	6		1	
No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			5	5	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to have the Special Operations Liaison Element linked to the Special Operations Command and Control Element located with the Joint Force Land Component Commander.	1	6	2	1	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process need to be clearly prioritized between the Joint Force Air and Joint Force Special Operations.	2	8			
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to communicate the location of Special Operations Forces throughout the Joint Operational Area. This does not mean sharing with allied nations or with everyone in the Air Operations Center.	1	5	2	1	

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure that Special Operations Forces have blue force trackers to prevent fratricide.		1	6	2	1
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure Special Operations Tactical Teams have the ability to communicate at all times in the event of a Time Sensitive Target.		2	8		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to decrease the level required for approval authority of Special Operations Missions.			8	2	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.		1	4	4	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.		1	5	3	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase III, Capabilities analysis.		1	6	2	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.		2	5	2	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.		2	6	1	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase VI, Combat assessment.		2	5	2	1
Special Operations Forces are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system				7	3
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system normally after Special Operations Forces are on the ground.		1	6	2	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only when airpower cannot do the job.		1	3	4	2
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when other components identify a need.			5	4	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when a high profile target of operational or strategic significance is identified by the Joint Force Commander.		4	4	2	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only as an afterthought.		1	1	6	2
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.		4	6		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.		5	5		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase III, Capabilities analysis.		5	5		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.		4	6		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.		4	6		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase VI, Combat assessment.		3	7		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process immediately and Special Operations Forces should be listed on the Air Tasking Order by target number.		3	5	2	
Targeting should take place in the Joint Special Operations Task Force.		2	6	2	
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process.		3	7		
The joint targeting process should be modified by listing all Special Operations Targets on the Air Tasking Order.		1	6	3	
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the responsiveness to Time Sensitive Targets.		7	3		
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the technology across the joint community to allow inter-communications.		4	6		
The joint targeting process should be streamlined.		5	5		
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow equal consideration for all assets and components in every step of the targeting process.		4	4	2	
The joint targeting process is currently based on an air-centric approach		6	3	1	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow Liaison Officers the ability to represent their components.		2	8		
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow for the training of personnel prior to employment.		1	9		
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow the targeting to be conducted at the Joint Task Force level.		2	6	2	
The joint targeting process should be modified to provide a rapid response from dedicated ground support aircraft.		3	6	1	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow all Special Operations Aircraft to automatically appear on the Air Tasking Order.			5	4	1
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to compartmentalize Special Operations Activities.		1	5	3	1
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow additional education on the joint targeting process.		1	7	2	
The joint targeting process should not be modified.		1		5	4
The joint targeting process should not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.		1		7	2
More training and education for Conventional Forces to understand Special Operations capabilities are needed in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.			2	7	1
The Special Operations Liaison Element should be properly manned in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		3	7		
A cell should be established in the Special Operations staff in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.			9	1	

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
The Battlefield Coordination Detachment should be taught more about the nature and methods of Special Operation employment in order to better integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		2	8		
Special Operations personnel should be school trained in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		2	8		
Special Operations personnel should be trained on the measures of effectiveness of Special Operations lethal and non-lethal targeting effects in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		
United States Special Operations Command must push to refine command and control augmentation for Theater Special Operations Commands in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		3	6	1	
Rehearsals must be factored into the targeting process in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		2	8		
Since Special Operations Forces are a finite resource, planning considerations for reconstituting them need to be factored in order to fully integrate them into the joint targeting process.		4	5	1	

APPENDIX I

LIKERT SCALE (INSTITUTIONAL BASED)

Survey Control # 03-018 CGSC - DAD				
Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Instructions: This is Phase 2 of the Delphi Study. On this modified Likert Scale, indicate by placing an "X" in the appropriate column to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements which were generated by the panel of experts during Phase 1.				
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Special Operations Liaison Element.	7	2	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process through the Joint Targeting Control Board.	4	4	2	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process by nominating Special Operations targets to the Joint Targeting Control Board.	1	4	3	2
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase I, (Commander's objectives, guidance and intent) of the targeting process.	6	3	1	
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process during Phase III, (Capabilities analysis) of the targeting process.	8	2		
Special Operations Forces are presently integrated into the joint targeting process at the Joint Special Operations Task Force.	5	4	1	
Special Operations Forces are represented on the Joint Targeting Control Board just like any other major subordinate command.	6	2	2	
Special Operations Forces are presently developing their own sources and choosing their targets with the approval of the commanding general.	7	3		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to deconflict air to ground Special Operations Forces to prevent fratricide.	3	7		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to conduct all necessary planning to fully integrate Special Operations Forces.	1	4	4	1
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for all targeting functions for Special Operations Forces.	5	3	2	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is responsible for ensuring the Special Operations Forces component target list make it to the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.	1	6	1	3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to provide the Joint Targeting Control Board with Special Operations Forces capabilities and limitations.	8	2		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to issue warning orders to the Special Operations Component Force.			7	3
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is air-ground coordination with supporting air elements/commands in order to enhance mission accomplishment.	4	6		
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is continuous tracking of all US/Coalition SOF air-ground elements.	3	7		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Instructions: This is Phase 2 of the Delphi Study. On this modified Likert Scale, indicate by placing an "X" in the appropriate column to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements which were generated by the panel of experts during Phase 1.					
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is deliberate planning and coordination with Joint Force Air Component Command and the Joint Special Operations Air Component in support of planned Special Operations Force missions in order to obtain and ensure proper air support in terms of Close Air Support, intelligence and electronic warfare, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, Combat Search and Rescue, and other air assets included in the Master Air Attack Plan.		3	5	2	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is immediate planning and deconfliction as required during the prosecution of Time Sensitive Targets.		2	7	1	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is designed to coordinate personnel recovery and unconventional assisted recovery.			5	5	
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to integrate all Special Operations air and surface activity into the air tasking order and Airspace Control Order.		1	8	1	
The Special Operations Liaison Element has no role in the joint targeting process			1	3	6
The Role of the Special Operations Liaison Element in the joint targeting process is to ensure the appropriate Special Operation targets are integrated into the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.		6	1	3	
Special Forces personnel (Master Sergeants and Majors) who are educated in the process of Special Operations Liaison Element should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element.		7	2		1
Nine ground Special Operations Forces personnel are sufficient to man the Special Operations Liaison Element.			3	3	4
The required allocation of slots recommended by regulation for the Special Operations Liaison Element should be filled.		7	3		
Manning of the Special Operations Liaison Element should be reduced.				2	8
Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCOORD) and J3(G3) Air should be added to the Special Operations Liaison Element to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process		5		4	1
Special Forces Noncommissioned Officers who are assigned to the Special Operations Liaison Element do not have the necessary rank to interact within the Air Operations Center.			8		2
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by field artillery personnel and aviation personnel to provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			7	2	1
Special Operations Liaison Element can be augmented by the battlefield coordination detachment to help provide expertise to integrate Special Operations land forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			6	4	
Theater Special Operations Commands have a targeting section in the J5 or J35 to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			4	3	3
Standing targeting personnel with the proper training should be assigned to Theater Special Operations Commands / Special Operations Liaison Element to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.		7	3		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
		9	8	7	6
Military academic institutions should educate students on the capabilities of Special Operations Forces.		9	1		
Identified 18 series personnel who might work as targeteers should attend the Joint Targeting School to improve integration of Special Operations Force into the Joint Targeting Process.		8	2		
Special Operations Forces need increased education in the joint targeting process to understand how targets are identified by the tactical ground elements and how they are placed on the Joint Integrated Priority Target List.		9	1		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are technology dependent and must have the ability to communicate across the full spectrum of the battlefield.		6	3	1	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process are available through the use of a communication chat tool.		1	5	4	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the Air Defense Operations Center Joint Fires Initiative (JFI) which has the potential to integrate all targeting (planned/unplanned) and can enable parallel target planning and execution real time for the entire joint community.		1	8	1	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure the Special Operations Commander has direct access to the Special Operations Liaison Element 24/7.		2	8		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to give Special Operations Forces their own close air support and air interdiction capability (Jets).		6		3	1
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is the development of a "fusion cell" located at the Joint Force Commanders Headquarters with the responsibility of targeting		6	3	1	
No additional alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures would improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process.			1	3	6
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to have the Special Operations Liaison Element linked to the Special Operations Command and Control Element located with the Joint Force Land Component Commander.			4	6	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process need to be clearly prioritized between the Joint Force Air and Joint Force Special Operations.			10		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to communicate the location of Special Operations Forces throughout the Joint Operational Area. This does not mean sharing with allied nations or with everyone in the Air Operations Center.		3	4	3	

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure that Special Operations Forces have blue force trackers to prevent fratricide.		5	2	3	
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to ensure Special Operations Tactical Teams have the ability to communicate at all times in the event of a Time Sensitive Target.		4	6		
Alternative tactics, techniques, and procedures available to improve integration of Special Operations Forces into the Joint Targeting Process is to decrease the level required for approval authority of Special Operations Missions.		5	2	3	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.		1	7	1	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.		1	3	5	1
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase III, Capabilities analysis.		1	4	5	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.		1	4	5	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.		1	9		
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system at Phase VI, Combat assessment.		2	7	1	
Special Operations Forces are not considered a viable and tactical weapons system		1	2	5	2
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system normally after Special Operations Forces are on the ground.		1	3	6	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only when airpower cannot do the job.			6	2	2
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when other components identify a need.		2	6	2	
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system when a high profile target of operational or strategic significance is identified by the Joint Force Commander.		4	6		
Special Operations Forces are considered a viable and tactical weapons system only as an afterthought.		1	5	2	2
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase I, Commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.		7	3		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase II, Target development, validation, nomination, and prioritization.		8	2		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase III, Capabilities analysis.		8	2		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase IV, Commander's decision and Force assignment.		8	2		

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase V, Mission planning and Force execution.		8	2		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process during Phase VI, Combat assessment.		8	2		
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process immediately and Special Operations Forces should be listed on the Air Tasking Order by target number.		7	1	2	
Targeting should take place in the Joint Special Operations Task Force.		7	2	1	
Special Operations Forces should be applied in the joint targeting process		8	2		
The joint targeting process should be modified by listing all Special Operations Targets on the Air Tasking Order.		2	5	3	
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the responsiveness to Time Sensitive Targets.		7	3		
The joint targeting process should be modified to increase the technology across the joint community to allow inter-communications.		3	7		
The joint targeting process should be streamlined.		2	6	2	
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow equal consideration for all assets and components in every step of the targeting process.		3	5	2	
The joint targeting process is currently based on an air-centric approach		8	2		
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow Liaison Officers the ability to represent their components.		2	2	6	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow for the training of personnel prior to employment.		4	6		
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow the targeting to be conducted at the Joint Task Force level.		1	7	1	1
The joint targeting process should be modified to provide a rapid response from dedicated ground support aircraft.		2	7	1	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to allow all Special Operations Aircraft to automatically appear on the Air Tasking Order.		2	6	2	
The joint targeting process should be modified in order to compartmentalize Special Operations Activities.			3	6	1
The joint targeting process should be modified to allow additional education on the joint targeting process.		2	7	1	
The joint targeting process should not be modified.		1		4	5
The joint targeting process should not be modified if the Joint Manning Document is filled.			2	3	5
More training and education for Conventional Forces to understand Special Operations capabilities are needed in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		
The Special Operations Liaison Element should be properly manned in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		
A cell should be established in the Special Operations staff in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		2	4	3	

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Statement		3	7	6	1
The Battlefield Coordination Detachment should be taught more about the nature and methods of Special Operation employment in order to better integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.					
Special Operations personnel should be school trained in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		3	7		
Special Operations personnel should be trained on the measures of effectiveness of Special Operations lethal and non-lethal targeting effects in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		
United States Special Operations Command must push to refine command and control augmentation for Theater Special Operations Commands in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		4	6		
Rehearsals must be factored into the targeting process in order to integrate Special Operations Forces into the joint targeting process.		1	3	6	
Since Special Operations Forces are a finite resource, planning considerations for reconstituting them need to be factored in order to fully integrate them into the joint targeting process.		2	8		

GLOSSARY

Air Force Special Operation Component. Is the Air Force component of a joint force special operations component.

Air Operation Center. The principal air operations installation from which aircraft and air warning functions of combat air operations are directed, controlled, and executed. It is the senior agency of the Air Force Component Commander from which command and control of air operations are coordinated with other components and Services.

Airspace Control Order. An order implementing the airspace control plan provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document.

Air Superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

Air Support Request. A means to request preplanned and immediate close air support, air interdiction, air reconnaissance, surveillance, escort, helicopter airlift, and other aircraft missions.

Air Supremacy. That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.

Air Tasking Order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provided specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies as well as general instructions.

Allocation. It's the distribution of limited resources among competing requirements for employment.

Allocation Request. A message used to provide an estimate of the total air effort, to identify any excess and joint forces general support aircraft sorties, and to identify unfilled air requirement. This message is used only for preplanned missions and is transmitted on a daily basis, normally 24 hours prior to the start of the next air tasking day.

Allotment. The temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having combatant command (command authority).

Apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionment (e. g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning.

Army Air Ground System. Provides for interface between army and tactical air support of other Services in the planning, evaluating, processing and coordinating of air support requirements and operations.

Army Special Operations Component. The Army component of a joint force special operations component.

Army Special Operations Forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support operations.

CARVER. A special operations forces acronym used throughout the targeting and mission planning cycle to assess mission validity and requirements. The acronym stands for criticality, accessibility, and recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability.

Joint Air Operations. Air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made available by components in support of the joint force commander's operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.

Joint Air Operations Center. A jointly staffed facility established for planning, directing, and executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander's objectives.

Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List. A prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by a joint force commander and maintained by a joint task force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander's objectives and guidance.

Joint Targeting Coordination Board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components and, if required, component subordinate units.

Master Air Attack Plan. A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation of the joint air tasking order. It is sometimes referred to as the air employment plan or joint air tasking order shell. Information that may be found in the plan includes joint force commander guidance, joint force commander guidance, joint force air component commander guidance, support plans, component request, target update request, availability of capabilities/forces, target information from target lists, aircraft allocation.

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